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Abstract
Mobile agents participating in geo-presence-capable crowdsourcing ap-
plications should be presumed rational, competitive, and willing to deviate
from their routes if given the right incentive. In this paper, we design a
mechanism that takes into consideration this rationality for request satis-
faction in such applications. We propose the Geo-temporal Request Sat-
isfaction (GRS) problem to be that of finding the optimal assignment of
requests with specific spatio-temporal characteristics to competitive mo-
bile agents subject to spatio-temporal constraints. The objective of the
GRS problem is to maximize the total profit of the system subject to our
rationality assumptions. We define the problem formally, prove that it
is NP-Complete, and present a practical solution mechanism, which we
prove to be convergent, and which we evaluate experimentally.
1 Introduction
We refer to the capability of an application to access devices at particular
geographical locations and particular times as Geo-Presence. Typically, geo-
presence is supported through the use of dedicated agents operating in propri-
etary cyber-physical infrastructures, such as embedded sensors and actuators,
or input and output devices that are mounted in physical spaces. Clients of geo-
presence-capable systems submit spatio-temporal requests, which are assigned
by the system to mobile agents who are able to service such requests. We
categorize geo-presence-capable systems based on the mobility characteristics
of the agents as either infrastructure-based or crowdsourcing-based systems. In
infrastructure-based geo-presence-capable systems, agents are either stationary
such as in wireless sensor networks [23, 3], or have limited system-controlled
mobility such as in field coverage using robotics [11, 42, 45]. Alternatively, in
crowdsourcing-based geo-presence-capable systems [4, 1], agents must be pre-
sumed autonomous and rational, in the sense that they control their own mo-
bility and schedules.
Our work considers the second class of geo-presence-capable systems – namely,
crowdsourcing-based systems in which requests submitted by clients are out-
sourced to mobile users who subscribe as willing agents of the system through
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an open interface. Depending on the application, requests can range from taking
pictures of certain locations and at particular times to displaying advertisements
in certain locations at particular times. Moreover, we assume the subscribed
agents to be rational, and willing to deviate from their routes if given the right
incentive. Based on these assumptions, we consider a Geo-Presence as a Ser-
vice (GPaaS) framework, which provides market-place crowdsourcing services
using the help of already existing mobile agents in the field. The framework
acts as a proxy between clients with spatio-temporal requests and agents capa-
ble of satisfying these requests. The service provided by the GPaaS framework
is on-demand and is non-archival, i.e., data is only collected when requested
and is not stored for future use. The services provided are market-place priced
according to the supply and demand in the system, and are pay-as-you-go, i.e.,
clients only pay for services they requested over a given duration.
Although the request satisfaction problem in such a system may seem as
a traditional scheduling problem, the spatio-temporal constraints of the agents
and their willingness to deviate from their paths introduce a new class of schedul-
ing problems, in which the agents’ mobility can be managed. In this paper, we
formally define the Geo-temporal Request Satisfaction (GRS) problem as that
of finding the optimal assignment of requests with specific spatio-temporal char-
acteristics to competitive mobile agents subject to spatio-temporal constraints.
The objective of the GRS problem is to maximize the total profit of the system.
We define the problem formally, prove that it is NP-Complete, and present a
practical solution mechanism, which we prove to be convergent, and which we
evaluate experimentally.
Paper Outline. In Section 2, we define the Geo-temporal Request Satisfac-
tion problem and prove its NP-Completeness. In Section 3, we propose a heuris-
tic game-theoretic approach for solving the problem and analyze it analytically.
In Section 4, we evaluate its performance experimentally using simulations. In
Sections 5 and 6, we conclude with a discussion of the related work and of our
current and future work.
2 Geo-temporal Request Satisfaction Problem
2.1 Problem Definition
We model the structure of the mobility field (e.g., map of city or locale) as a
graph G = (V,E) in which the set of vertices V represents the various landmarks
in the field (e.g., intersections) and the set of edges E represents the links
between these landmarks (e.g., streets). We denote by R the set of requests
submitted to the system, and by A the set of agents participating in the system.
A request in R is defined by the 3-tuple (v, t, p()) where v ∈ V is the desired
location of the request, t ≥ 0 is its desired time, and p(v′, t′) is its valuation
function. The valuation of the request is maximum at the desired location v
and time t, and may differ otherwise. In particular, for v′ ∈ V and t′ ≥ 0, the
valuation of the request is given by p(v′, t′).
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An agent in A is defined by the 5-tuple (vo, to, vf , tf , c()) representing the
journey of the agent and its cost function. The agent’s desired journey is defined
by its starting location vo ∈ V and time to ≥ 0, as well as the desirable target
location vf ∈ V and latest arrival time to that location tf > to. The agent’s
cost function c(pj) defines the cost incurred by the agent when choosing the
path pj to make its desired journey.
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Definition 1 (The GRS Problem) Given the mobility field graph G, a list of
requests R, and a list of agents A, the GRS problem is that of finding a legit-
imate path for each agent in the list A that maximizes the total profit of the
system. The total profit of the system is defined as the difference between the
total valuation obtained from the serviced requests as defined by their valuation
functions and the total cost incurred by the agents servicing these requests as
defined by their cost functions. Moreover, a legitimate path has to satisfy the
journey constraints defined by the agent, i.e., start at its desired start location
and time and end at its destination at time t < tf .
2.2 GRS problem is NP-Complete
We prove that the GRS problem is NP-Complete by reducing it to the Hamil-
tonian Cycle problem. A Hamiltonian cycle is a cycle in an undirected graph
that visits each vertex exactly once and returns to the starting vertex. Given
any graph, determining whether a Hamiltonian cycle exists is known to be NP-
complete [15].
Theorem 2 The GPS problem is NP-Complete.
Proof. Consider an instance of the GRS problem where,
• The mobility field graph is defined as G = (V,E) with |V | = l.
• The list of requests R has l requests, in which each request ri is defined
by the tuple (vi, 0, p(v
′, t′)) and,
p(v′, t′) =
{
1 if v′ = v
0 otherwise
(1)
In other words, there exists a single request for each location in the graph
that can be satisfied at any time but only in its desired location.
• The list A with only one agent defined by (vi, 0, vi, l + 1, c(∗) = 0). In
other words, the agent starts moving from any location vi at the first time
step and is expected to arrive back at to its start location vi at some time
1The cost of a path pj can be defined as the extra number of hops in that path when
compared to the shortest path that can be used for the journey (as implemented later in this
paper), or it can be defined as the difference between the agent’s latest time of arrival tf and
the actual time of arrival.
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before tf = l+1, which is enough time for the agent to visit every location
in the graph only once. Moreover, the cost function of the agent is defined
to be 0 for any path chosen.
To find the optimal solution for this instance of the GRS problem, we need
to find a path for the agent which goes through each node in the graph to satisfy
all available requests thus maximuming the total revenue. Moreover, each node
in the graph has to be visited only once to allow the agent to return to his start
location at the defined time tf = l+ 1. Finding such a path amounts to finding
a Hamiltonian cycle in the graph starting and ending at the same node vi, thus
reducing our problem to the Hamiltonian Cycle problem. Since we know that
the problem of finding a Hamiltonian cycle in a graph is NP-Complete [15], we
prove that the GRS problem is also NP-Complete.
3 Geo-Temporal Request Satisfaction Games
Due to the NP-Complete nature of the GRS problem, we develop a heuris-
tic mechanism that takes into consideration the rationality of the agents, and
recasts the problem in a game-theoretic setting. We define the rules of the mech-
anism that allow agents to compete for servicing the highest paying requests in
the field. The objective of the game is to achieve a total profit that is as close
as possible to the social optimal.
3.1 Geo-temporal Request Satisfaction Game
As mentioned above, we recast the GRS problem as a game in which the each
agent represents a single player. In such a game, we define a player’s better
response move as a proposal to take a new path that improves its utility, given
that a player has knowledge about the current state of the system (e.g., the
requests available and other players moves). Moreoever, players moves are as-
sumed atomic and serial.
Definition 3 (The GRS Game) In the geo-temporal request satisfaction game,
players take turns in making better response moves that maximize their utility
until all players are satisfied with their path choices. The utility of a player in
the GRS game is defined as the total profit provided by the path chosen,
Uxi(pj) =
∑
rk∈pj
(prk())− c(pj) (2)
where pj is a legitimate path chosen by player xi, prk() is the valuation
function of request rk and c(pj) is the cost of path pj as defined by the cost
function of the agent.
Definition 4 (Domination Rule) Since players may choose to service the same
request, we define an arbitiration rule that decides which player is allowed to
service the request. Namely, the Domination Rule states that a player xi is
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(a) Initial state (b) State after first move (c) State after second move (d) State after third move
Figure 1: Counter example that proves the non-convergence of the GRS game.
allowed to dominate another player xj and claim a request rk serviced originally
by xj if the total profit obtained from rk when serviced by player xi is strictly
higher that when serviced by player xj.
Theorem 5 The GRS game may never reach Nash Equilibrium under better
response dynamics.
Proof. We prove this by providing a counter-example with an instance of the
problem, in which players never stop making the same set of repeated moves.
Consider the graph shown in the Fig.1, the set A = (s1, 1, d1, 4, c(∗) = 0), (s2, 1, d2, 6, c(∗) = 0)
of two players with zero cost functions, and the set R = (r1, 2, p1()), (r2, 2, p2())
of two requests with p1(v, t) = 7 − (t − 2) if v = 5, t ≥ 2 and 0 otherwise and
p2(v, t) = 3 if v = 7, t = 2 and 0 otherwise.
Assume the initial state of the game shown in Fig.1a, a2 claims request r1
for a utility of 7 while a1 has no choice but to stick to its shortest path with a
utility of 0. For the first move, a2 decides to change its path and claims both
requests r2 and r1 in that order with a utility of 8, giving a1 the chance to
dominate it and claim r1 with a utility of 6. Now that a2 has lost r1 and has
a utility of only 3, it makes a move and changes its path again and decides to
claim r1 only for a utility of 7, and a1 again has no choice but its shortest path
with a utility of 0. This sequence of moves is repeated over and over again,
leading to the non-convergence of this instance of the game. Thus, proving that
the GRS game does not always converge under better response dynamics.
3.2 Multi-stage Request Satisfaction Game
The dependability of the player’s utility function in the GRS game on the total
valuation of all requests serviced on the path chosen is the reason the game
does not always converge under better response dynamics. We overcome this
problem by redefining the player’s utility function to depend on the valuation
of the single highest paying requests that can be serviced on the path chosen.
Definition 6 (The GRS1 game) The modified geo-temporal request satisfaction
game takes as input the set of available requests and the set of agents journeys
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and cost functions. Players take turns in making better response moves that
maximize their utility until all players are satisfied with their path choices, and
the domination rule is applied. The utility of a player in the GRS game is
defined as,
Uxi(pj) = max(prk∈pj ())− c(pj) (3)
where pj is a legitimate path chosen by player xi, prk() is the valuation
function of request rk and c(pj) is the cost of path pj as defined by the cost
function of the agent.
We prove below that the GRS1 game does converge for all instances of the
game, for an extended proof please refer to our technical report [5]. After
convergence, each player decides on the path with the highest paying request,
and marks the request’s exact location and time as part of its journey. In other
words, the player’s original journey is divided into two smaller journeys; the
first new journey starts at the same location and time as the original journey
and ends at the marked location and time of the highest paying request, and
the second journey starts from the marked location and time and ends at the
original journey’s destination location and time.
Theorem 7 The GRS1 game reaches Nash Equilibrium under better response
dynamics.
Proof. To prove this theorem we show that the GRS1 game is an exact potential
game [28] with an increasing potential function,
Φ(si, s−i) =
∑
rk∈R
(prk − cost(xi)) (4)
where prk is the valuation function of the request rk and cost(xi) is the cost
incurred by the player xi that serviced that request rk.
In other words, the function Φ(si, s−i) measures the total profit of the system
after a player xi makes a move to the state of si. According to the definitions of
the potential function of the system and the utility function of the players, we
guarantee that the potential function Φ(si, s−i) is always increasing. Moreover,
since we know the maximum valuations that can be obtained from all requests
available and the maximum costs incurred by each player in the game, we know
that there exists a maximum profit value that the function Φ(si, s−i) cannot
exceed. Therefore, we guarantee that the GRS1 game reaches Nash Equilibrium
under better response dynamics.
According to the definition of the GRS1 game, at most a single request can
be serviced by each player. As a result, there may be requests that are left
unserviced. To service these leftover requests, we allow the agents to repeat the
game in a divide-and-conquer approach.
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Definition 8 (The GRS∗1 game) In the multi-stage geo-temporal request satis-
faction game, the GRS1 game defined above is repeated in a d¨ivide-and-conquera¨pproach.
In the first stage, the input of the GRS11 game is the set of all available requests,
and the set of agents journeys and cost functions. Then, for each stage k, the
input of the GRSk1 game is the set of leftover requests and the set of new jour-
neys and cost functions obtained from the output of the GRSk−11 game. The
multi-stage game stops when the output of the GRSk+11 game is the same as
that of the GRSk1 game, i.e., no more requests can be satisfied.
Lemma 9 The number of stages in a GRS∗1 game is polynomial.
Proof. In each GRS1 game, at most a single request can be serviced by each
player. Therefore, at the end of each stage of the GRS∗1 game one of these
three scenarios can occur, 1) No requests are satisfied, so the whole GRS∗1 game
ends, 2) Only a single request is satisfied from a total of n requests, thus leaving
n− 1 requests to be satisfied in the next stage, 3) More than one request (i) is
satisfied from a total of n requests, thus leaving n − i requests to be satisfied
in the next stage. From these three scenarios, the worst case scenario is the
second one, and if it occurs in each stage of the GRS∗1 game, we will get a total
number of |R| stages which is a polynomial.
Theorem 10 The Multi-step Request Satisfaction game reaches equilibrium un-
der better response dynamics.
Proof. By combining our conclusions from Theorem 7 and Lemma 9, we prove
that the GRS∗1 game has a polynomial number of stages and that the GRS1
game played in each stage always converges to a Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
any instance of the GRS∗1 game is proven to always converge under better
response dynamics.
4 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the GRS∗1 game, we designed several sets of
simulation-based experiments to compare it to other approaches and under dif-
ferent simulation settings. In this section, we explain our simulation setting and
the results obtained from the experiments performed on the GRS∗1 game.
4.1 Simulation Setting
We developed a C-sharp-based simulator to evaluate the performance of the
GRS∗1 game under different settings. The input of each simulation is a graph
representing the mobility field, the request arrival rate, the agent arrival rate
and the total simulation time. Once the simulation starts, a list of requests
and agents are generated with random attributes. Each request is assigned a
uniformly random location and time, and for simplicity, all requests are defined
with the same valuation function. Each agent is assigned a random schedule
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with uniformly random start location, start time, destination, latest arrival time,
and for simplicity, all agents are defined with the same cost function. The cost
function used by all agents in the simulator is defined as the extra number of
hops in the path chosen when compared to the shortest path that can be used
for the agent’s journey.
After all requests and agents are generated, the initial stage of the GRS∗1
game starts, and the initial list of players is created. Players have a set of
attributes that do not change during the stage, which are the start location,
start time, destination, latest arrival time and the set of possible paths from
the start location to the destination. Since the process of computing the list of
all possible paths between the start location and the destination is exponential
in nature, we use Yen’s ranking algorithm [27] to calculate the set of k-shortest
paths from the player’s start location to his destination. Then, we ensure that
only legitimate paths – the paths with suitable lengths – are added to the
player’s set of possible paths.
Each player also has a set of decision variables that are used during the
GRSk1 game played at each stage k to define its moves; the location it decides
to visit, the time it decides to visit it at, and the utility expected from such
a move. In each GRSk1 game, new players with journeys obtained from the
output of the GRSk−11 game join the game, and take turns to make better
response moves that maximize their utlity. The GRSk1 game ends when no
player wishes to make another move, thus ending a stage. Then, all satisfied
requests are removed from the requests’ list and a new players’ list is created as
described in the previous section. This is repeated until no more requests can
be satisfied.
When it’s a player’s turn to decide whether to make a move or not, it first
checks whether it has been dominated by another player and resets its decision
variables if true. Then, the player picks a random path from its set of possible
paths to the destination, and calculates the utility of that path as defined in the
GRS1 game. If the highest paying request was claimed by another dominating
player, the original player has to search for the request with the second highest
profit on the same path, and update the path’s utility accordingly. This process
is repeated till either the player finds a suitable request, or no requests are
available. If an unclaimed request is found, and it provides a higher utility
value for the player, the player decides to make a move, selects the chosen path,
claims the request and updates its decision variables. Otherwise, the player
decides not to make a move.
4.2 Simulation Results
We created several sets of experiments to evaluate the MRS game’s performance,
and their results are shown below. In all the experiments, we define the profit
ratio as the evaluation metric, which is the ratio of the total profit obtained
from the game, to the maximum profit available. Moreover, for each set of
experiments, we perform 25 simulations and calculate the average profit ratio.
In the first set of experiments, we compare the performance of the game to
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm which describes how MRS is implemented.
stopGame ⇐ False
lstPlayers ⇐ Agents
while NOT(stopGame) do
stopGame ⇐ True
stopStep ⇐ False
while NOT(stopStep) do
stopStep ⇐ True
for all p ∈ lstPlayers do
if p makes a move then
stopStep ⇐ False
end if
end for
end while
lstNewPlayers ⇐ Empty
for all p ∈ lstPlayers do
if p.decRequest 6= null then
stopGame ⇐ False
lstNewPlayers.ADD(Player(p.startLoc, p.startTime, p.decLoc,
p.decTime, p.decTime-p.startTime))
lstNewPlayers.ADD(Player(p.decLoc, p.decTime, p.finishLoc,
p.finishTime, minLength(p.decLoc,p.finishLoc)))
end if
end for
lstPlayers = lstNewPlayers
end while
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm which descibes how a player decides to make a move.
if decRequest 6= null and decRequest.satAgent 6= thisID then
utility ⇐ 0
decLoc ⇐ finishLoc
decTime ⇐ finishTime
decRequest ⇐ null
end if
Pick a path from the k-possible paths at random
Get highest paying unclaimed request (r) on that path
Calculate the newUtility of that path
if newUtility ¿ utility then
utility ⇐ newUtility
decLoc ⇐ r.location
decTime ⇐ r.time
decRequest ⇐ r
r.profit ⇐ newUtility
r.satAgent ⇐ thisID
return TRUE
end if
return FALSE
Figure 2: The comparison between the MRS game, shortest path and random
path approachs.
two traditional approaches for request satisfcation in geo-temporal settings, the
shortest path and the random path approaches. In the shortest path approach,
agents choose the shortest path available to go to their destinations, and in
the random path approach agents choose any random legitimate path. In both
approachs, all the requests in the way of the agents are serviced. This set
of experiments is based on a 200 ∗ 200 cartesian Manhatten-style grid, with a
request arrival rate of 0.4 requests per time unit and total simulation time of
1000 time units.
The results shown in Fig.2 represent the average profit ratio of all ap-
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Figure 3: The effect of increasing the number of k-shortest paths used by each
player.
proaches, when varying the agent arrival rate from 0.01 to 2.6 agents per time
unit. The results show the superiority of the GRS∗1 game; the performance im-
proves monotonically as the number of agents in the field increases. Although
the performance of the game improves as the agent arrival rate increases, the
experiments shows that the marginal utility of considering additional agents
is negligible for higher values of the agent arrival rate, which shows that the
game performs as expected. As for the other approaches, the performance of
the shortest path approach is always less than 15% and irregular, while the
performance of the random approach becomes irregular after an agent arrival
rate of 0.6.
In the second and third sets of experiments, we evaluate the GRS∗1 game’s
performance under different settings. The second set of experiments is based on
a 200∗200 cartesian Manhatten-style grid with a request arrival rate of 0.4, and
a total simulation time of 1000 time units. We vary the number k of shortest
paths obtained from Yen’s ranking algorithm to be used in the set of possible
paths to the destinations from 1 path - the shortest - to 80 paths. The results
shown in Fig.3 represent the average profit ratio for agent arrival rates of 0.4
and 0.8. The results show that only a small number of k – smaller state space
– provides us with almost maximal performance. In other words, the marginal
utility of considering additional paths is negligibal with larger values of k, which
also shows that the game performs as expected.
The third set of experiments is based on a 200 ∗ 200 cartesian Manhatten-
style grid and a 15 ∗ 15 cartesian Manhatten-style grid with a request arrival
rate of 0.4 and a total simulation time of 1000 time units. The results shown
in Fig.4 represent the average profit ratio when varying the agent arrival rate
from 0.01 to 2.8 agents per time unit. These results show that an increase in
the agents density on the field, improves the game’s performance, proving its
accuarcy.
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Figure 4: The effect of increasing the agent’s density in different sized graphs.
Table 1: Our classification of geo-presence-capable systems.
Mobility pattern of agents Example
Stationary Wireless sensor networks [23]
Controlled mobility Robotics [42]
Mobile wireless sensor networks [11]
Coordinated mobility Work done in [30]
Uncontrolled mobility Opportunistic sensor networks [8]
Crowdwoursing applications [4]
5 Related Work
The resource allocation problem is a classic problem that has been studied
for several years in distributed systems such as in [14, 32] where resources are
reserved to satisfy the requests in the system to improve system utilization
while providing a quality of service guarantee for the requests. In [9], authors
propose algorithmic mechanisms that maximizes the benefit of the system while
providing a guarantee of correctness and reliability of the resources reserved
for request satisfaction. For crowdsourcing-based geo-presence capable systems,
such classic resource allocation algorithms will not be appropriate due to the
mobile nature of the agents in the system which are considered the resources
needed to be allocated for the requests. Our classification of the four different
classes of geo-presence-capable systems according to the mobility patterns of
the agents is shown in Table 1.
Traditional wireless sensor networks as described in [23, 3, 2, 10] are direct
examples of the first class of geo-prescence-capable systems that are based on
stationary agents. In such systems, the sensors are set up in fixed geographical
locations in the field and are viewed as the stationary agents of the system,
sensors continuously collect and process data and send them to aggregate points
to be furthur processed for specific applications. Data from wireless sensor
networks are mainly processed using two different methods, online and offline.
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In the online method, the data collected by the sensors are processed in real-time
for specific application requirements such as in [40, 26]. In the offline method,
the data collected by the sensors are stored in databases to be queried by users in
the future, in this case the spatio-temporal request satisfaction process is defined
as the transformation of the requests into an appropriate queries to be applied
on the database. Most work in spatio-temporal databases has been on defining
an appropriate query language, improving query processing and improving data
collection from sensor nodes as in [6, 16, 18].
In the second class of geo-presence-capable systems, agents in the system
have a controlled mobility pattern which means that their mobility is controlled
by the system itself. Agents in these systems are usually robots or mobile
sensor nodes with no selfish motive and their path decisions are made to accom-
plish the system’s objective. Mobility control is widely used for field coverage
[19, 42, 45], maintainance of communication chains [33, 11] or for specific task
accomplishment [35, 34, 31, 29, 17] and they vary from centralized to decen-
tralized approaches according to the requirements and the assumptions of the
system.
In the third class of geo-presence-capable systems, agents have uncontrolled
mobility patterns. Such agents are self-motivated with predefined schedules.
They willingly participate in the system and decide whether or not to perform
a task - service a request - according to their prior plans and they may alter
their schedules to perform a task if given the right incentive to do so. However,
that decision is solely theirs and the system cannot dictate and/or predict their
behaviour. In this third class of geo-presence capable systems, clients are not
given any guarantees about the response time or response quality for their re-
quests and the request satisfaction process is an ad hoc, opportunistic process.
Crowdsourcing systems fall into this class of systems whether enterprise-based
crowdsourcing applications as Amazon Mechanical Turk [4] or location aware
systems as in [1] and [44].
In enterprise-based crowdsourcing systems such as Amazon Mechanical Turk
[4], Flicker [43], Poptent [36] and UTest [41], clients simply post their requests
and state what needs to be done and the payment they are willing to pay for
satisfying the specified request. Agents access the requests list and decide which
requests they can satisfy according to the nature of the request and the agent’s
schedule. Research on such systems ranges from analysis of the different system
components and the quality of work performed by the agents [20], to proposals
of how task description and pricing should be standardized to achieve better
service and better guarantees [21, 39], to work on how to provide incentives for
agents to participate in such crowdsourcing systems [24]. Due to the nature
of the agents in such systems and their method of accessing the requests, the
request satisfaction process depends solely on the decisions of the agents and
the system cannot provide any guarantees to its clients.
For location-aware crowdsourcing systems, researchers have been recently
proposing to incorporate human hand-held devices into sensor networks thus
creating what is known as opportunistic sensor networks. In this variation of
sensor networks, the sensor nodes are the devices carried by the mobile agents,
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such as smart phones, laptops or special sensor equipped vehicles. Authors in [1,
44, 22] propose visions of building a complete heterogenous opportunistic sensor
network which can be used for any crowdsourcing application, while authors
in [25] propose and build a specific crowdsourcing applicaton for only image
translation and authors in [7] propose and build a Twitter-based application for
answering location-based queries. Work done on opportunistic networks focuses
on how to improve the quality of feedback in the system by either allowing
agents to alter their transmission range radii to cover more area and satisfy more
requests while applying a rendezvous opportunities to exchange information
about requests between the agents while minimizing energy consumption [13,
12], or by allowing agents to delegate work to each other [8] , or by allowing
all the request scheduling process to be performed in a distributive manner
where requests are sent from one agent to the other till the agent with the right
requirements recieve it and satisfy it [38]. As mentioned above, the request
satisfaction process in such systems is opportunistic and ad hoc, however, recent
systems such as in [39, 25, 7, 37] propose to assign a request to a set of agents
who have a matching context with it.
Finally we define the last class of geo-presence-capable applications, where
agents have coordinated mobility patterns. Agents with coordinated mobility
patterns are regular self-motivated mobile agents as explained above ,but are
willing to do minor modifications to their schedules given the right incentive.
This notion of mobility coordination has first been proposed in [30] according
to our knowledge where the authors assume that mobile nodes have a flexibility
in their schedule and they leverage this flexibility or what they define as slack
to obtain a certain coverage distribution of the network.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we defined the problem of request satisfaction in geo-presence-
capable crowdsourcing applications and proved it to be NP-Complete. We pro-
posed a practical solution mechanism for the problem, namely the GRS game,
and proved that it might not always converge under better response dynamics
because of the definition of the players utility functions. We then proposed a
modified version of the game, namely the GRS∗1 game, and proved that it al-
ways converges under better response dynamics, which we then evaluated using
simulated experiments, and showed its accuracy and superiority.
We are currently building a prototype for the proposed GPaaS framework,
in which the GRS∗1 game is used for request satisfaction. We are implementing
the main components of the framework on a cloud-based platform to provide
the framework’s services to clients and agents using any device from any lo-
cation. Clients and agents can access these services through traditional web-
based browsers, or through mobile applications that we are currently developing.
Moreover, we intend to improve the method by which a player chooses a path
when playing the GRS∗1 game. The current method of choosing a path from
the set of possible paths obtained by Yen’s ranking algorithm is computationaly
14
expensive, thus affecting the game’s total response time.
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